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Comparing Gausian and exact models of malicious
interference in VLC systems
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Abstract—Visible Light Communication (VLC) is a technique
for high-speed, low-cost wireless data transmission based on
LED luminaries. Wireless LAN environments are a major ap-
plication of VLC. In these environments, VLC is used in place
of traditional systems such as Wi-Fi. Because of the physical
characteristics of visible light, VLC is considered to be superior
to traditional radio-based communication in terms of security.
However, as in all wireless systems, the security of VLC with
respect to eavesdropping, signal jamming and modification must
be analyzed. This paper focuses on the aspect of jamming in VLC
networks. In environments where multiple VLC transmitters are
used, there is the possibility that one or more transmitters will
be hostile (or “rogue”). This leads to communication disruption,
and in some cases, the hijacking of the legitimate data stream. In
this paper we present the theoretical system model that is used in
simulations to evaluate various rogue transmission scenarios in
a typical indoor environment. The typical approach used so far
in jamming analysis assumes that all disruptive transmissions
may be modeled as Gaussian noise, but this assumption may
be too simplistic. We analyze and compare two models of VLC
jamming: the simplified Gaussian and the exact model, where
the full characteristics of the interfering signal are taken into
account. Our aim is to determine which methodology is adequate
for studying signal jamming in VLC systems.
Keywords—Visible light communication networks, Network
security, Physical layer security, Transmission jamming
I. INTRODUCTION
V ISIBLE light communication (VLC) was first proposedin the early 2000s [1]–[3]. It uses single LED or
multiple-LED luminaries as the wireless transmitter and pho-
todiodes or CMOS-sensor cameras as the receiver. The driving
factor behind the development of VLC is the growing popu-
larity of LED-based lightning. LED based luminaries are 60 –
80 % more energy efficient than incandescent and fluorescent
light sources – hence more environmentally friendly. They are
also more reliable (in terms of mean time before failure). In a
VLC system, data is transmitted by rapidly switching the light
source on and off or by modulating the intensity of the light
source at a rate that is significantly higher than the perception
limits of the human eye.
A. VLC – technology and applications
The throughput of VLC systems has significantly improved
as new techniques for the transmitter and receiver design
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have been introduced: in the first experimental systems, data
transmission in the range of 40 Mb/s was achieved [4], and
100-200 Mb/s has been demonstrated [5] with an improved
single-emitter–single-receiver scenario and On-Off Keying.
Data rates in the range of 1 Gbps were attained with Orthogo-
nal Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM) [6] and arrays
of separately driven light sources and multiple receivers (VLC
MIMO) [7]. Recently, with the use of GaN violet micro-LEDs,
a data transfer speed in the range of 10 Gb/s has been found to
be achievable [8]. For more information on the development
of VLC technology, we refer the reader to the survey papers
by Pathak and Khan: [9], [10].
Significant applications of VLC technology have been pro-
posed and implemented, some experimentally, while some
have found commercial implementations, the most important
being:
• peer-to-peer data exchange – such as between handheld
devices,
• data broadcasting — for example in home audio and
video streaming,
• multimedia conferencing,
• general data communication in personal and local wire-
less area networks (WPAN and WLAN),
• localization and navigation, both indoor (for example in
large shopping centers, museums, etc. where GPS signal
may be unavailable) and outdoor – where it can be
integrated with traffic light system,
• targeted advertisement and communication,
• home automation, inventory management and asset track-
ing – which is related to the IoT environment,
• Vehicle Area Networks (VANETs) and intelligent trans-
portation systems in vehicle-to-vehicle and vehicle-to-
roadside communication.
More information on VLC applications may be found in: [6],
[11]–[14]. In recent years, a lot of effort has been made to
commercialize VLC technology. For example, PureLiFi Ltd.
– founded by a pioneer of VLC research Harald Hass –
developed a VLC Access Point ”LiFi-X” – promoted as a
replacement for a traditional Wi-Fi AP with an uplink and
downlink data rate of 43 Mbps.
B. VLC security issues
Security requirements for VLC-based WLANs are not dif-
ferent from the general security requirements for other wireless
systems. The aim is to protect data transmission against attacks
such as eavesdropping, jamming, data modification, etc. The
complete set of security requirements is often collectively
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presented as the CIAA suite, i.e.: Confidentiality, Integrity,
Authenticity and Availability.
It is important to enumerate the key factors differentiating
radio-based and light-based WLANs:
• VLC uses a broadcast channel, so in principle it is
difficult to shield transmitted data from bystanders.
• In VLC WLANs, the Line-of-Sight (LoS) signal com-
ponent is dominant over the Non-Line-of-Sight (NLoS)
– this is in contrast to RF-based WLANs, therefore,
signal reflection leading to multipath effects is far less
significant in VLC.
• With current technology, it is not possible to use phase
modulation in VLC systems. In effect, channel entropy
in VLC systems is lower than in RF-based systems.
• Because of physical LEDs characteristics the modulating
electrical current must fall within strict amplitude con-
straints (mainly to avoid nonlinear effects). Hence, inten-
sity modulation (IM) and Direct Detection (DD) are used
in VLC. The transmission channel is typically modeled
with amplitude constraints (average power constraint is
typically used in RF).
• In VLC, signal superposition may lead to the overlapping
of multiple signals at the receiver, which in turn is a
potential threat to integrity, authenticity and availability
The feasibility of conducting different types of attacks on
VLC systems was discussed in [15]. In particular, with regard
to availability and integrity requirements, the possibility of
introducing a VLC jamming device was considered. This is
difficult for mobile-to-mobile and fixed-to-mobile communica-
tion modes, but is achievable in the ”infrastructure” scenario.
In this paper we will focus on VLC applications in office
environments, where it is used as a primary or supplemental
WLAN. In such an environment, the users are mobile and
network coverage must be provided in the whole given area,
hence multiple transmitters (APs) are used. A jamming at-
tack in an infrastructure-type VLC system requires a rogue
transmitter, and in general it is more difficult to introduce
such a device into a VLC network than into a RF-based
network, where it can be physically out of the users’ eye-
sight. However, in installations with multiple transmitting
luminaries, for example in multi-transmitter system based
on femtocells, a malicious AP may easily pass undetected.
Attackers may also try to ”hijack” the VLC system via the
network infrastructure backbone. In a large installation, such
malicious intervention may pass undetected.
Theoretical rationale for VLC jamming was formulated in
[16], where it was shown that a VLC signal source with suffi-
cient transmission is able to to saturate the channel effectively
obscuring the legitimate data source. The same effect may
be achieved with the use of a number of hostile low-power
transmitters.
C. Scope and structure of paper
In this paper we will focus on VLC systems used in office-
type environments in an infrastructure mode, i.e. as a replace-
ment or an augmentation for ”traditional” RF-based WLANs.
The possible scenarios for jamming attacks in office-based
VLC systems were discussed in [17]. Here we develop further
work presented in the above quoted paper and investigate
mathematical models used to simulate the jamming process.
A typical approach for computing the influence of the jammer
assumes that all disruptive transmissions may be modeled
as Gaussian noise. Contrastingly, in an ”exact” model (first
described by [18]), the full characteristics of the interfering
signal are taken into account. The major contribution of this
paper is a detailed comparison and benchmarking of both the
Gaussian and the exact models, in order to determine which
is adequate for studying signal jamming in VLC systems.
This paper is structured as follows: in section II we dis-
cuss the principles of VLC modeling and introduce Gaussian
and exact models; in section III we describe the simulation
technique and software; in section IV we present and discuss
simulation results; and in section V we summarize the paper
and outline areas of future research.
II. THE GAUSSIAN AND EXACT MODELS
A. Channel model
We will consider an indoor (office space) model with N
fixed transmitters and a mobile receiver. The transmitter is an
LED source, and the receiver a non-imaging photodetector. We
will assume that On-Off-Keying (OOK) modulation is used,
with ”0” represented by completely turning off the light source
and ”1” by the source transmitting with some fixed power. We
will also assume that the probabilities of the 0 and 1 symbols
are equal to 50%. The master clock cycle is T , hence the
bandwidth is: B (B = 1T ). With this we can calculate bit
error rate (BER), our major benchmarking factor, as:
BER = Q(
√
SNR) (1)
where Q is the statistical Q-function defined as [19]:
Q(x) =
1√
2pi
∫ ∞
x
e
(
−u22
)
du
The signal received Y (t) is given by:
Y (t) = RpX(t) ∗ h(t) +N(t) (2)
where:
• X(t) is the transmitted signal
• Rp is the receiver gain,
• h(t) is the channel gain function,
• N(t) is the channel and receiver noise,
• ∗ is the convolution operator.
We will calculate SNR as follows:
SNR =
R2pP
2
recSignal
N
(3)
where:
PrecSignal =
∫ T
0
(
N∑
i=1
hi(t) ∗X(t)dt) (4)
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transmiter
receiver
Fig. 1. Spacial arrangement of transmitter and receiver
N is the total noise power, given as:
N = σ2shot + σ
2
thermal + σ
2
inter (5)
Shot noise is calculated as follows:
σ2shot = 2qRpPrB + 2qIbgI2 (6)
where Pr = Pinter + PrecSignal. (q is the elementary charge,
and I2 is the receiver characteristic constant.)
Interference noise is expressed by:
Pinter =
∫ ∞
T
(
N∑
i=1
hi(t) ∗X(t)dt) (7)
Thermal noise (σthermal) is determined mainly by the
receiver’s physical characteristics and some basic physical
constants. To keep this discussion brief, we refer the reader to
[3] for further details regarding the physical aspects of thermal
noise calculation.
Now, we can introduce the formula for channel gain h which
is derived from the geometrical model of the VLC channel, as
first formulated in [3] The light sources are treated as Lam-
bertian emitters. To calculate gain at the receiver’s location
we must account for the contribution of each light source. In
the LoS model, only direct illumination is considered; in the
NLoS model, light reflections from walls and other surfaces
must be taken into account. In typical office conditions, the
NLoS component contribution is typically below 5
h = H(0) =
(m+ 1)Ar
2piD2
cosm (φ)T (ψ)g(ψ) cosψ (8)
where the m factor: m = − ln 2ln (cosφ1/2) is characteristic of
the Lambertian emitter, and:
• Ar – area of the photodetector,
• φ is the angle of irradiance (see figure 1)
• ψ is the angle of incidence (see figure 1)
• T (ψ) is the receiver filter gain,
• g(ψ) is the receiver concentrator gain,
• D is the distance between a transmitter and receiver.
In a typical case of the receiver being placed on a flat surface
facing upwards (towards the light source): ψ = φ.
We will denote the bit sequence transmitted by transmitter
j as {bkj }∞k=−∞, because OOK modulation bkj assumes only
0 and 1 values with equal probability. The signal at the
transmitter can be expressed as:
Xj(t) = pj
k=∞∑
k=−∞
bkj rect(t− kT ) (9)
where rect(t) is the unit-amplitude rectangular pulse of
duration T and pi is the optical power of the emitter when
transmitting symbol 1. The received signal is given as:
Yi(t) =
N∑
j=1
RphijXj(t− dij) +Ni(t) (10)
where dij is the time delay between the transmitter j
and receiver i1, and Ni is the superposition of shot and
thermal noise modeled as AWGN at the receivers’ location.
The channel gain hij is as expressed in eq. 8 assuming LoS
between LED j and the receiver.
B. Demoduation model
For the purpose of exact modeling, we must focus on the
detection process in the receiver in the presence of noise. At
the receiver, the signal is demodulated with a matched filter.
Demodulation is followed by a 0-or-1 decision with a threshold
ξ. By s0i (t) we denote the receiver–i impulse response with
an amplitude of 1 and duration T . At this point we consider a
scenario where transmitters and receivers are paired – dii = 0.
We will introduce the case where multiple LEDs transmit
simultaneously to one receiver later in this section. The first
transmitted bit overlapping with the interval [0, T ) is b0j and
is followed by b1j , etc. Let τij ∈ [0, 1) denote the time-
normalized misalignment of b0j and b
0
i . We assume that τij
is constant in the current transmitter–receiver configuration.
After demodulation, the signal is expressed as:
yi =
1
T
∫ T
0
ri(t)s
0
i (t)dt
= pihiiRp +
∑
j 6=i
pjhij(τijb
0
j + (1− τij)b1j )Rp + ni
(11)
where
ni =
1
T
∫ T
0
ni(t)s
0
i (t)dt (12)
1By receiver i, we understand the receiver located at some arbitrary location
denoted as i.
280 G. BLINOWSKI, A. MOS´CICKI
represents AWGN with the distribution given by:
N(0, σ2shot + σ
2
thermal).
To simplify, we will introduce Wij = τijb0j + (1 − τij)b1j .
Eq. 11 can be now rewritten as:
yi = pihiiRp +
∑
j 6=i
pjhijWijRp + ni (13)
Notice that Wij is a discreet random variable taking val-
ues {τij , 1 − τij , 1, 0} as illustrated in table I. In eq. 13
in the context of eqs. 4 and 7, the first sum component
expresses the part of the signal transmitted by the ”source”
LED: PrecSignal = pihiiRp, while the second component
is the interference generated by other LEDs – Pinter =∑
j 6=i pjhijWijRp.
The noise component can be expressed as:
σ2noise = σ
2
shot + σ
2
thermal
= 2qRp(pihiiRp +
∑
j 6=i
pjhijWij)B
+ 2qIbgI2 + σ
2
thermal
(14)
C. Exact model
In this subsection we present the exact analysis of BER as
was first proposed by Chen et al. in [18]. In eq. 1, we substitute
values of the received signal and noise power – eq. 3 according
to the equations for power presented above. The transmission
error occurs when ”1” is classified by the receiver as ”0” or ”0”
is classified as ”1”. This leads to two error ”scenarios”. The
case where ”0” is classified as ”1”, pi = 0 (”0” is transmitted,
hence 0 is substituted), for a given Wij is expressed by eq. 20.
The second case: ”1” classified as ”0”, pi = pt, for a given
Wij is expressed by eq. 21. Eq. 15 lets us calculate exact BER
for our model. The derivation of the exact model formula is
presented in Appendix A
D. Decision threshold for the exact model
To determine the exact BER as expressed by eq. 15, we
must compute the optimal decision threshold ξ. In general,
this can only be done with the use of a one-dimensional
search, but an approximate analytical formula was proposed
[18] under the reasonable assumption that the data signal is
larger than the aggregated interfering signals, so that ξ is in
the range: [
∑
j 6=i pjhijRp, pihiiRp]. In the above cited work
it was proven that the value of ξ minimizing BER is given by:
BERexact(i) =
1
4N−1
∑
WiN∈{τiN ,1−τiN ,0,1}
. . .
∑
Wi1∈{τi1,1−τi1,0,1}[1
2
Q
( ξi −∑j 6=i pjhijWijRp√
2qRp
∑
j 6=i pjhijWijB + 2qIbgI2 + σ
2
thermal
)
+
1
2
Q
( (pihii +∑j 6=i pjhijWij)Rp − ξi√
2qRp(pihii +
∑
j 6=i pjhijWij)B + 2qIbgI2 + σ
2
thermal
)]
(15)
TABLE I
POSSIBLE VALUES OF Wij WITH RESPECT TO TRANSMITTED SYMBOLS.
Wij b
0
j b
1
j
0 0 0
1− τij 0 1
1 1 1
τij 1 0
ξi =
1
2
(∑
j 6=i
pjhijRp + pihiiRp
)
(16)
E. Gaussian model
The formula for exact BER calculation – eq. 22 – with
an exponentially growing number of sum components is not
typically used. Instead it is common to treat all interference
as white Gaussian noise. If in eq. 13 we approximate the
term responsible for interference:
∑
j 6=i pjhijWijRp with a
Gaussian random variable, we obtain a much simpler Gaussian
interference model. The expression for BER becomes:
BERgauss(i) =
[1
2
Q
( ξi − 12∑j 6=i pjhijRp√∑
j 6=i p
2
jh
2
ijR
2
p
(
1
2τ
2
ij − 12τij + 14
)
+ 2qIbgI2 + σ2thermal
)
+
1
2
Q
( (pihii + 12∑j 6=i pjhij)Rp − ξi√∑
j 6=i p
2
jh
2
ijR
2
p
(
1
2τ
2
ij − 12τij + 14
)
+ 2qRppihiiB + 2qIbgI2 + σ2thermal
)] (17)
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An outline of derivation of eq. ?? can be found in Appendix
A. The formula obtained for simplified BER presented above
is much simpler then eq. 15 because it eliminates the need
to iterate over all interference components – all interfering
sources are represented by one term instead.
F. Cooperating transmitters
The analysis presented in the preceding sections refers
to the case where the receiver is paired with exactly one
transmitter. However, for a practical scenario in which we
would like to study the influence of one or more interfering
transmitters, we must adjust the model to accommodate for
a group of cooperating ”legitimate” transmitters and one or
more rogue transmitters. Such a configuration generates an
additional condition expressed as:
ph =
parts∑
k
pkhk (18)
This leads to the following:
• Legitimate transmitters are synchronized. Such an as-
sumption is reasonable and has been demonstrated in
practice for very high transmission bandwidth ranges
[20].
• For synchronized transmitters we will ignore signal prop-
agation delays, and in consequence inter-symbol interfer-
ence (ISI). For a typical indoor scenario, this limits the
transmission bandwidth to approx 100 Mb/s. (ISI is of
course accounted for between groups of legitimate and
rogue transmitters).
• When a rogue transmitter (or transmitters) is active, there
are two possibilities: we are aware of this fact or we are
not. This leads to a different approach in the analytical
calculation of the threshold ξ. In the “a prior” (rogue
aware) case, eqs. 15 and 17 should be applied and ξ
calculated to account for the known interference. In the
“a posteriori” case, ξ is computed as if no interference
exists. The formula for the exact and Gaussian model is
the same - eq. 19.
BERexact,nointer(i) = BERgauss,nointer(i) =
1
2
Q
( ξi√
2qIbgI2 + σ2thermal
)
+
1
2
Q
( pihiiRp − ξi√
2qRppihiiB + 2qIbgI2 + σ2thermal
) (19)
III. SIMULATION SCENARIOS
In our simulations we considered a room of length 7.2
m, breadth 7.2 m and height 2.9 m. A receiver is placed at
desk level, at a height of 1.25 m from the floor. The room
dimensions are higher than those typically considered in
similar models [21]–[23]. In our opinion, ours is a more
realistic scenario reflecting true office spaces. The design of
the scenario aims to provide ergonomic lighting conditions
which meet current industry standards. The arrangement of
luminaries and choice of their parameters is based on our
TABLE II
SIMULATION PARAMETERS – RECEIVER.
Parameter Value
FOV 60◦
Bandwidth 100 Mb/s
Area 10−4 m2
Concentrator gain g(ψ) =
1.52
sinFOV for ψ < FOV
g(ψ) = 0 otherwise
previous work [17], where a discussion of modeling office
VLC environments can also be found. The major difference
between this and the above cited work is in the crucial issue
of modeling interferences: in [17], both natural interference
and hostile (i.e. jamming) luminaire influence is modeled
simply with a normal Gaussian distribution, while in this
work we are modeling the jamming influence with an exact
model.
The parameters of the room and the VLC system are given
in tables II and III. Simulations were conducted for several
different scenarios of luminaire arrangement with different
choices of legitimate and rogue transmitters. The scenarios
are as follows:
• G1 – a 3x4 recessed luminaire grid – Fig. 2. This scenario
represents the most common, standard solution for office
spaces. One type of luminaire (type g) is used in this
arrangement – a square 60 x 60 cm panel module with a
70 deg. radiation semi-angle.
• G2 – a 2x4 recessed luminaire grid with an additional
1x3 array of downlight lower power elements – Fig.
2. This is an augmented version of G1, typical for
office meeting rooms, open spaces, etc., with downlights
providing additional illumination in recessed areas which
are further from natural sources of light. Two types of
luminaires are used in this and the next scenario: g-type
used in scenario G1 and lower-power luminaires – d
with a more narrow radiation semi-angle of 30 deg.
• GC – a 2 x 3 luminaire grid surrounded by a circular
arrangement of lower power downlight elements – Fig.
3. Such an arrangement is used in rooms with little or no
access to natural light. This scenario also provides a more
uniform light distribution in the room perimeter, which
is a favorable feature for VLC communication.
In figures 2 – 4, the scale is in meters, and the numbered
dots represent individual luminaries. For each scenario: G1,
G2 and GC, a set of rogue transmission arrangements was
simulated:
• G1 – rogue transmitters are: independently g7 or g10, or
simultaneously both g7 and g10.
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TABLE III
SIMULATION PARAMETERS – LUMINAIRES.
Luminaire type g d
LED irradiance semi-angle
at half power 70
◦ 30◦
Luminous flux 2000 lm 1600 lm
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x
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G
Fig. 2. Scenario G1 – a 3x4 recessed luminaire grid.
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Fig. 3. Scenario G2 – a 2x4 recessed luminaire grid with an additional 1x3
array of downlight lower power elements.
• G2 – rogue transmitters are: d2 or d1, d2, d3 (simulta-
neously).
• GC – rogue transmitters are: d1 – d5 (simultaneously) or
d6 – d10 (simultaneously).
All tests were conducted in both in the a priori and a
posteriori scenarios (see section II-F).
Fig. 4. Scenario GC – a 2 x 3 luminaire grid with an additional circular
arrangement of lower power downlight elements.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
A. Scenario G1
The simulation results for scenario G1 are shown in figures
5 – 7. Isolines indicate BER levels of: 10−2, 10−3, 10−5.
These values were chosen based on the fact that the BER level
of 10−3 is the maximum limit for voice-type transmission and
the level of 10−5 is the maximum for data transmission with
FEC (Forward Error Correction). Black isolines are relevant
to the Gaussian model and red ones to the exact model (the
same also applies to subsequent simulation scenarios G2 and
GC).
Let us analyze the first case with one rogue transmitter
located in the center – fig. 5. In the “a priori case” (i.e. when
we anticipate that the given transmitter is rogue) it is possible
to compensate for the presence of the rogue transmitter by
adjusting the threshold value ξ, hence there are no red isolines
for this case (left diagram). For the “a posteriori” case (right
diagram) we can observe the influence of the rogue transmitter.
Furthermore, for the exact model, the increased BER value due
to g7 interference is more contained than for the Gaussian
model. From this case we can conclude that the exact model
shows slightly lower levels of interference (with respect to
the affected room area) than the Gaussian model. In the exact
model, approx. 10% of the total area exhibits BER in the range
of 10−3 or larger. This is 28% in the Gaussian model.
In the second simulation, the rogue transmitter is located
next to the wall – fig. 6. The area affected is larger than in
the previous case and in the “a priori” variant, higher BER
levels can be observed. This is due to the fact that there is
a smaller number of legitimate transmitters in the vicinity
which can compensate for the rogue one. In the exact model,
approx. 16% of the total area exhibits BER in the range of
10−3 or larger; in the Gaussian model this is 30%. Again
we can conclude that for the exact model, the increased
BER value due to interference is more contained than for the
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Fig. 5. Simulation for the G1 scenario, rogue transmitter is g7. Left: “a priori”
case, right: “a posteriori” case.
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Fig. 6. Simulation for the G1 scenario, rogue transmitter is g10. Left: “a
priori” case, right: “a posteriori” case.
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Fig. 7. Simulation for the G1 scenario, rogue transmitters are g7 and g10.
Left: g7 and g10 are synchronized; right: g7 and g10 are independent. Top
two diagrams represent “a priori” case, bottom “a posteriori”.
Gaussian model.
The next simulation considers a case when two transmitters
are rogue. We have chosen g7 and g10, with two alternatives
of independence between them or full synchronization. The
results are shown in fig. 7. Here we can make the following
observations:
• As in the previous test case, the exact model shows
slightly lower levels of interference (with respect to the
affected room area) than the Gaussian model.
• Rather obviously, the overall influence of two rogue
transmitters is larger than one; in the exact model and
the “a priori” variant, it is not possible to compensate for
the joint influence of g7 and g10 in the vicinity of g7
(refer to fig. 5).
• In the case of synchronized rogue transmitters (graphs
on the left), in the Gaussian model the area influenced
by rogue transmitters is larger than in the case of inde-
pendent transmitters (graphs on the right) both in the “a
priori” and “a posteriori” case. This is in accordance with
intuition – the effect of synchronized rogue transmitters
should be stronger than the effect of independent ones.
• A similar but weaker effect can be observed in the exact
model.
• The more realistic “a posteriori” (no knowledge of the
rogue transmission) shows a significantly larger influence
of the rogue transmitters. Again, the area affected is
smaller in the exact model, but still approx. 27% of the
whole area shows BER in the range of 10−3 or larger,
and in the Gaussian model, the influenced area is 43%.
B. Scenario G2
The placement of luminaries in this scenario is similar to
the previous one, but less homogeneous – instead of a regular
3 x 4 grid of identical transmitters, a 2 x 4 grid is used
augmented with a “line” of narrow-angled emitters by the
wall. The introduction of a different set of emitters makes
the possibility of their physical takeover more likely. We can
also assume that such downlight emitters could be installed
for the sole purpose of introducing rogue transmitters. We will
analyze two cases: with one rogue emitters – fig. 8 – and with
three rogue emitters (all d-type emitters are rogue) – fig. 9.
The influence of d-type emitters is more local because of their
narrow angle.
• As in the previous test cases, the exact model shows
slightly lower levels of interference (with respect to the
affected room area) than the Gaussian model.
• There is no visible difference between “a priori” and “a
posteriori” cases. This is due to the lower power and
lower semiangle values of the rogue luminaries.
• Perhaps surprisingly, there is no difference in results
obtained for synchronized and independent transmitters.
This is because of the narrow angle of luminaire ”d”.
However, this limitation becomes critical in different
luminaire arrangement models.
• In the exact model for one rogue transmitter and the “a
posteriori” case, the area affected by rogue transmission
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Fig. 8. Simulation for the G2 scenario, rogue transmitter is d2. Left: “a priori”
case, right “a posteriori”.
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Fig. 9. Simulation for the G2 scenario, rogue transmitters are d1, d2, d3. Left:
rogue transmitters are synchronized; right: rogue transmitters are independent.
Top two diagrams represent “a priori” case, bottom “a posteriori” case.
occupies approx. 6% of the whole area. For three trans-
mitters, the area affected is 20%.
C. Scenario GC
In this scenario, we assume that some of the d-type
luminaires have become rogue. Note that the d-type luminaire
has different characteristics than the g-type: it has lower power,
and more importantly a narrower illuminance half-angle,
hence its influence is more “local”. The simulation results
are shown in fig. 10. The following observations can be made:
• As in the previous test cases, the exact model shows
slightly lower levels of interference (with respect to the
affected room area) than the Gaussian model,
• There is a smaller difference between “a priori” and “a
posteriori” cases in this simulation than in G1. This is
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Fig. 10. Simulation for the GC scenario, rogue transmitters are d1 – d5. Left:
rogue transmitters are synchronized; right: rogue transmitters are independent.
Top two diagrams represent “a priori” case, bottom “a posteriori” case.
caused by lower power and lower semiangle values of
the rogue luminaries.
• As in G2, there is no difference in results obtained for
synchronized and independent transmitters.
• In the exact model and “a posteriori” case, the area
affected by rogue transmission occupies approx. 14% of
the whole area; in the Gaussian model this is 17%.
It is worth mentioning here that in scenarios with a larger
number of luminaries, “a priori” calculation become very time-
consuming. This is because of the time needed to find the ξ
threshold in the exact model: increasing the number of rogue
transmitters by one increases the time needed 4-fold.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we have presented a numerical study of
a VLC system with rogue transmitters. We have compared
two numerical models used to simulate VLC environments:
a Gaussian model in which rogue transmitters are treated
as yet another source of white noise interference, and an
exact model in which the full characteristics of the interfer-
ing signal are taken into account. Both models were tested
by comparing simulation results in three different scenar-
ios (luminaire arrangements), each with two kinds of rogue
transmitter placement. Additionally we have tested two ways
of approaching the rogue transmission – in an “a priori”
case, where the system is aware of the rogue transmitter and
tries to compensate for its influence by altering the detection
threshold, and in a more realistic “a posteriori” case, where
there is no knowledge about rogue transmission placement and
number. The conclusions are as follows:
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Both models show similar patterns of raised BER levels;
the exact model is more “optimistic” – the areas affected
by interfering transmitters are 10% – 50% smaller according
to the particular scenario. The exact model’s simulation can
become very time-consuming with an increasing number of
rogue transmitters because of the complexity of the algorithm
used to find the ξ threshold, but this is only the case in
the a priori approach. In general, the exact model is more
numerically complex and we can conclude that in practical
cases using the simpler Gaussian model would suffice, as it
gives a “worst case estimate” of the area affected by rogue
transmitter(s).
APPENDIX A
DERIVATION OF FORMULAS FOR EXACT AND GAUSSIAN
MODELS
The formula for BER in the exact model is calculated as
follows (refer to section II-C ):
Perr(yi > ξ|b0i = 0) = Q
(ξi −RpPr√
σ2noise
)
= Q
(ξi − (pihii +∑j 6=i pjhijWij)Rp√
σ2shot + σ
2
thermal
)
= Q
(ξi − (pihii +∑j 6=i pjhijWij)Rp√
σ2shot + σ
2
thermal
)
= Q
( ξi − (pihii +∑j 6=i pjhijWij)Rp√
2qRp(pihiiRp +
∑
j 6=i pjhijWij)B + 2qIbgI2 + σ
2
thermal
)
2
= Q
( ξi −∑j 6=i pjhijWijRp√
2qRp
∑
j 6=i pjhijWijB + 2qIbgI2 + σ
2
thermal
)
(20)
Perr(yi ≤ ξ|b0i = 0) = Q
( (pihii +∑j 6=i pjhijWij)Rp − ξi√
2qRp(pihii +
∑
j 6=i pjhijWij)B + 2qIbgI2 + σ
2
thermal
)
. (21)
Eqs. 20 and 21 represent BER for a given value of Wij .
To obtain the final formula, we must take the average over
all possible combinations of Wij , i.e.: 4N−1 cases. This is
expressed by eq. 22
BERexact(i) =
1
4N−1
∑
WiN∈{τiN ,1−τiN ,0,1}
. . .
∑
Wi1∈{τi1,1−τi1,0,1}[1
2
Q
( ξi −∑j 6=i pjhijWijRp√
2qRp
∑
j 6=i pjhijWijB + 2qIbgI2 + σ
2
thermal
)
+
1
2
Q
( (pihii +∑j 6=i pjhijWij)Rp − ξi√
2qRp(pihii +
∑
j 6=i pjhijWij)B + 2qIbgI2 + σ
2
thermal
)]
(22)
The formula for BER in the Gaussian model is calculated
as follows (refer to section II-E ):
We treat the interference component –
∑
j 6=i pjhijWijRp –
as a Gaussian random variable, with mean m and variance σ2I
calculated as follows:
All possible values of Wij are contained in: {τij , 1 −
τij , 1, 0}, where each element occurs with the same proba-
bility, hence:
m =
∑
j 6=i
pjhijRp
τij + 1− τij + 1 + 0
4
) =
1
2
∑
j 6=i
pjhijRp
(23)
The variance is derived as follows:
σ2I =
∑
j 6=i
p2jh
2
ijR
2
p
( (τij − 12 )2 + (1− τij − 12 )2 + (1− 12 )2 + (0− 12 )2
4
)
=
∑
j 6=i
p2jh
2
ijR
2
p
(1
2
τ2ij −
1
2
τij +
1
4
) (24)
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